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Political Homophobia  






This article examines the current state strategy of political homophobia used by the 
Russian government to create a sense of national identity by scapegoating Russian 
homosexuals as "foreign agents," reinforcing the power of the governing elite, and 





“West will fall in the same way as the Roman Empire fell before it, because 
in the Roman army it all started with the fact that the soldiers were no 
longer engaged in battles and indulged in “the charms of homosexual 
love.” (State Duma deputy Vitaly Milonov in an interview to the Russian 
News Service)1 
 
Political homophobia as a state strategy is a phenomenon that has attracted 
scholarly attention at the beginning of the 21st century as more states across the 
globe resort to it in their domestic policies.2 In the case of Russia discussed below, 
I show that political homophobia as a modular oppressive strategy has been used 
to legitimize the current authoritarian political regime, to unify national identity, 
and to present the country’s particular values as distinct from those of the West. 
In order to show what Wiess and Bosia call the “modular” character of political 
homophobia, I rely on current research in the area of political homophobia, 
analyze Russian homophobic legislation, and compare Russia to Poland , a country 
that also previously introduced similar legislation and employed similar rhetoric 
of political homophobia.  
In this paper I argue that political homophobia as a state strategy is embedded 
into Russian history and since 2012 has been actively employed by the Russian 
authorities. This paper is an opportunity to look at the current homophobic 
outburst as a deliberate political strategy carefully crafted in Russia. In my 
                                                           
1 Previously being a member of St. Petersburg city hall, Milonov was the main sponsor of 
the city “gay propaganda law.” 
2 See. Weiss, M. L., & Bosia, M. J. (2013). Global Homophobia: States, Movements, and 
the Politics of Oppression. Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press. 
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understanding of political homophobia, I will rely on the work of Wiess and Bosia 
(2013) who understand political homophobia as a 
 
purposeful [strategy], especially as practiced by state actors; as embedded 
in the scapegoating of an “other” that drives processes of state building and 
retrenchment; as the product of transnational influence‐peddling and 
alliances; and as integrated into questions of collective identity and the 
complicated legacies of colonialism. Specifically, we target the overt 
deployment of homophobia in political rhetoric and policy as a remarkably 
similar and increasingly modular phenomenon across a wide range of cases. 
(p. 14) 
 
In their definition, Bosia and Weiss highlight the modular nature of political homophobia, 
that is, exhibiting similar characteristic across cases where present. I argue that the new 
round of political homophobia that was launched approximately in 2012 with regional and 
federal legislation exposes the modular character of Russian political homophobia. 
Approaching homophobia as explicitly the deliberate and modular political strategy offers 
a different way to understand the power dynamic that goes beyond one case, one country. 
Homophobia as a political strategy in not unknown to Russian politics. During the 
Soviet period, Stalin skillfully used homophobia to attack political opponents and 
consolidate power (Healey, 2002; Healey, Baer, & Stella, 2008). With the collapse 
of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Iron Curtain, the young democratic 
government in Russia was more focused on stabilizing the economy than on 
building political participation. “Shock therapy” aimed at changing the economy 
and “the initial impoverishment that came along with it had more of a 
‘demasculinizing’ effect, as many men could not meet the new market-derived 
standards for masculine achievement” (Sperling, 2014, p. 60). The effect was so 
profound that some scholars called it “crisis in gender identities, and particularly 
masculinity” (Goscilo & Strukov, 2010, p. 11). Together with the loss of the status 
of superpower and, as a result, diminishing role of the country in international 
affairs, led to the fact that “Russia in the 1990s was quite often portrayed not as a 
mother but rather as a woman of easy virtue; prostitution became a metaphor for 
the country’s foreign policy” (Riabov & Riabova, 2014, p. 25). Therefore, one of 
the earliest political acts undertaken by Putin when he became president in the early 
2000s was the change of discourse to include patriotic terms and images to 
reinstate Russian masculinity on the political level and consolidate public support.  
The state strategy of political homophobia, among other policies of nation 
building, was deployed in 2012 as a response to the ideological vacuum that had 
been created by the collapse of the Soviet Union. I argue that modern Russia under 
the rule of President Vladimir Putin has deployed political homophobia as part of 
a range of policies aimed at (re)creating a sense of national identity that is not 
based on western liberal values.  
Being essentially an “imagined community” of separated individuals, nations 
are constructed through language and discourse (Anderson, 1983, p. 15; Martin, 
1995; De Cillia, Reisgl, & Wodak, 1999). Because they are “mobilized into 
Journal of Global Initiatives      142 
 
 
existence through symbols invoked by political leadership” (Dryzek, 2006, p. 35) 
discourses are powerful tools in constructing, perpetuating, transforming, or 
dismantling national identities (De Cillia, Reisgl, & Wodak, 1999). Therefore, 
discursive practices of homophobia used by the political leadership in laws and 
public speeches constantly recreate a sense of national identity distinct from the 
West with its emphasis on liberal values (Healey, Baer, & Stella 2008, pp. 6-7).  
To denote the gradual shift toward a politics of nationalism, I introduce the 
term “conservative heteronationalism”. Analogous to Jasbir Puar’s (2007) 
homonationalism, heteronationalism deploys heterosexuality as a modular type of 
sexual behavior forming the basis of nation where queer sexualities are not 
included into the process and become marginalized as unproductive sexualities 
(Foucault, 1990).3 The conservatism is expressed by the desire to look for role 
models of sexual behavior in history, which is selective and biased. Conservative 
heteronationalism is a state strategy that occurred in the Russian Federation under 
Putin. A main objective in the deployment of modular political homophobia is to 
create a collective identity for Russian nationalists.  
For Bosia and Wiess (2013), political homophobia is connected to the legacy 
of colonialism. Russia has never been colonized by a foreign power. However, the 
period of the 1990s was characterized by the majority of common people as the 
country’s ‘quasi-colonialization’, turning it into ‘a raw material appendage of the 
West’ (Kotz, 1999). I argue that the feeling of lost sovereignty and independence 
was the trigger that contributed to the formation of a public demand for a new type 
of leadership that would not be directly associated with the West, and therefore in 
the public eye would not look dependent. The people were searching for a hero, 
someone who could bring the lost pride and political status back to them. Putin 
was such a figure, whose “self-assertion as a tough, strong, masculine, and, above 
all, patriotic leader protecting Russia” was seen as capable of rectifying the status-
quo (Sperling, 2014, p. 78). 
I associate the deployment of political homophobia in Russia with the impact 
of internal as well as external factors. The introduction of conservative rhetoric 
into Russian domestic politics is closely related to the international milieu around 
Russia in the mid-2000s. The relations between the West and Russia started to 
deteriorate after the famous Munich speech the Russian president Putin delivered 
during Munich Security Conference in Germany on 10 February 2007. Putin 
criticized the West in general and the USA in particular for “monopolistic 
dominance in global relations” (Lekic, 2007). The speech marked the beginning 
of a policy of deterrence in the relations between Russia and the West and the 
further events (the Russian-Georgian war, the chain of color revolutions in the 
countries of the former USSR and so on) laid the foundation for mutual distrust 
(Koshkin, 2016, p. 6). The speech reignited the suspicion of the NATO 
enlargement among Russian elite as well as Russian population (Jégo, 2008; 
                                                           
3 Thus heteronationalism is based, in part, on the idea that the result of the sexual behavior 
is pleasure and not the birth of children. 
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Kryshtanovskaya, 2008; Neef, 2016). Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, who 
replaced Putin in early 2008, in his address to the Federal Assembly the same year 
expressed the concerns saying that “Russia’s strength is being tested” by the 
NATO members (Medvedev, 2008). 
The Putin administration changed its rhetoric toward a more critical position 
on the West (Shimov, 2017). Confrontation with Western countries required a 
change in internal discourse, which happened with the gradual introduction of the 
language of traditional values. People impoverished and humiliated in the 1990s 
politics of “shock therapy” welcomed the changed course. “Russia is getting up 
from its knees” became a slogan of growing anti-westernization in the country 
(Rubov, 2008). The new ideology of conservative traditional values involved 
many actors such as the ruling United Russia party, Cossacks, and most 
importantly the Russian Orthodox Church, whose position on homosexuality has 
traditionally been hostile (Zorgdrager, 2013). The Russian Orthodox Church, 
politically disempowered during the soviet times, became engaged in politics after 
the collapse of the USSR in 1991 but did not gain political prominence until the 
late 2000s when the newly invigorated Russian Orthodoxy has been deployed to 
play a crucial part in the new politics of conservatism (Anderson, 2007; Mitrokhin, 
2009; Willems, 2006).  
I argue that the launch of political homophobia in Russia has been closely 
connected to changes in the country's foreign policy due to deteriorating relations 
with Western countries and the necessity to legitimize the current political regime 
inside the country. Conservative heteronationalism, enshrined in the legislation, 
excludes queer Russians from the definition of a truly Russian citizen. LGBTQ 
advocacy groups, funded from abroad, are deemed “foreign agents” serving 
interests of Russian adversaries. Such a hostility from the government promotes 





Homophobia as a social phenomenon has been a scholarly focus from many 
different perspectives. Scholars have been studying the interconnections between 
states and the homophobic attitudes of the population and their effect on LGBTQ 
rights activists (Frohlich, 2011). Homophobic attitudes have been also scrutinized 
from the position of relations between Christianity and homophobia (Birken, 
1997) and homophobia and masculinity (Stein, 2005). Bosia and Weiss (2012) 
pioneered the study of homophobia as a modular and deliberate political strategy 
that has taken place in different parts of the world. 
There is a growing body of scholarship focused particularly on examining 
homophobia in Russia from the political standpoint. There is scientific research in 
the area of history (Ashwin, 2000; Engelstein, 1995; Healey 1993, 2002, 2003; 
Healey, Baer, & Stella, 2008) and the sociology of homosexuality in Russia (Baer, 
2002, 2009). This literature suggests a perpetuated feeling of homophobia within 
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the Russian population due to the historical legacy of homosexuality in Soviet 
times and negative discourse produced by the state today. 
There is also a significant amount of research in the area of masculinity and 
its nexus to the political regime, attitudes, and culture (Clements, Friedman, & 
Healey, 2002; Makarychev & Medvedev, 2015; Riabov & Riabova, 2014; 
Sperling, 2014). Sperling (2014) argues that masculinity plays a key role in 
legitimizing the Russian political regime. She writes, 
 
In the contemporary Russian case, the Kremlin deployed a legitimation 
strategy that included stressing Putin’s machismo–a strategy that bled over 
into popular cultural productions of the same ilk.[…] Traditional 
masculinity, therefore, enables male political leaders (and some female 
ones as well) to assert their power over others who can be identified or 
characterized as traditionally feminine.[…] Political actors employ widely 
familiar cultural notions of masculinity, femininity, and homophobia 
(heteronormativity) as political tools in their performance of legitimacy. 
(Sperling, 2014, p. 3) 
 
Researchers also note a growing influence of the Russian Orthodox Church as an 
authoritative actor in producing homophobic discourse and reinforcing traditional 
gender roles (Sperling, 2014; Stähle, 2015; Zorgdrager, 2013). Taking into 
consideration the fact that the majority of the population identify as orthodox 
Christians, the Church’s position on social issues has a significant impact on 
societal perception. 
Scientists have studied the role media plays in the construction of homophobia 
within the Russian context (Persson, 2015). Media has a significant influence on 
people’s attitudes toward such social issues (Gainous, 2007; Venzo & Hess, 2013). 
Gomillion and Giuliano (2011) have examined how the media has influenced self- 
realization, coming out, and current identities of American homosexuals “by 
providing role models and inspiration” (p. 330). There is also a body of research 
on discursive practices within local LGBTQ communities developed in response 
to societal homophobia in Russia (Kondakov, 2011, 2013a, 2013b). The use of 
such discrete language helps Russian queers stay unnoticed in the hostile 
environment. For example, the usage of the phrase “byut v teme” (“to be in the 
theme”) which means to belong to the LGBTQ+ community. For a person who 
does not know, this phrase does not carry any obvious semantic load, for an 
initiate, this kind of “fluid” identity allows one to avoid the daily hostile and 
homophobic environment (Kondakov, 2013b).  
In my research, I place Russia within a broader international context in order 
to show that current homophobic discourse and “anti-gay” legislation passed in 
2013 is not unique to Russia and represents a wider attempt of different 
authoritarian states to use homosexuality politically to their advantage. 4 However, 
                                                           
4 The federal law “For the Purpose of Protecting Children from Information Advocating for 
a Denial of Traditional Family Values” of June 11, 2013 and enacted on June 30, 2013. 
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unlike in places like Uganda or Egypt, Russian homosexuals are hostages of 
complicated foreign policy games between Russia and the West. I argue that the 
politics of homophobia launched by Putin is a direct consequence of deteriorating 




In this study, I analyze regional as well as federal legislation that was developed 
between 2006 and 2013 in Russia and which were aimed at regulating queer public 
visibility. An examination of legislation is particularly important because it 
denotes both the will of the legislator and demonstrates the perpetuation of 
political homophobia in the law. For example: the Law of the Region of Ryazan 
dated June 15, 2006 N 66-03, “On the Changes in the Law of the Region of 
Ryazan”; “On the Administrative Violations”; and several other nearly identical 
bills adopted by Arkhangelsk in 20115, Kostroma6, Saint Petersburg7, 
Novosibirsk8, Magadan9, Samara10, Baskortostan11, and Krasnodar12 in 2012, and 
Irkutsk13 and Kaliningrad14 in 2013. In addition to these, I consider the federal law 
“For the Purpose of Protecting Children from Information Advocating for a Denial 
of Traditional Family Values” which was unanimously passed on June 30, 2013. 
                                                           
5 Law of the Arkhangelsk Region of December 15, 2009 N 113-9-OZ “On certain measures 
to protect the morality and health of children in the Arkhangelsk region” 
6 Law of the Kostroma Region of February 15, 2012 N 193-5-ZKO “On Amendments to the 
Law of the Kostroma Region “On Guarantees of the Rights of the Child in the Kostroma 
Region and the Code of the Kostroma Region on Administrative Offenses” 
7 Law of St. Petersburg of February 29, 2012 N 238 “On Amendments to the Law of St. 
Petersburg" On Administrative Offenses in St. Petersburg” 
8 Law of the Novosibirsk Region of June 14, 2012 N 226-OZ “On Amendments to Certain 
Laws of the Novosibirsk Region” 
9 Law of the Magadan Region of June 9, 2012 N 1507-OZ “On Amending Certain Laws of 
the Magadan Region in the Protection of Minors from Factors Negatively Affecting Their 
Physical, Intellectual, Mental, Spiritual and Moral Development” 
10 Law of the Samara region of July 10, 2012 N 75-GD “On Amendments to the Law of the 
Samara Region” and “On Administrative Offenses in the Territory of the Samara Region” 
11 Law of the Republic of Bashkortostan of July 23, 2012 N 581-з “On Amending the Law 
of the Republic of Bashkortostan,” “On Basic Guarantees of the Rights of the Child in the 
Republic of Bashkortostan.”. 
12 Law of the Krasnodar Krai of July 3, 2012 N 2535-KZ “On Amendments to Certain 
Legislative Acts of the Krasnodar Region in Part of Strengthening Protection of Health and 
Spiritual and Moral Development of Children.” 
13 Law of the Irkutsk Region of April 24, 2013 N 29-OZ “On Amendments to the Law of the 
Irkutsk Oblast “On Certain Measures to Protect Children from Factors Negatively Affecting 
Their Physical, Intellectual, Mental, Spiritual and Moral Development in the Irkutsk Region”  
14 Law of the Kaliningrad Region of January 30, 2013 N 199, “On Amendments and 
Additions to the Kaliningrad Oblast Law “On Protection of the Population of the Kaliningrad 
Region from Information Products Harming the Spiritual and Moral Development,” and Law 
of the Kaliningrad Region of January 30, 2013 N 196, “On introducing amendments to the 
Kaliningrad Oblast Law ‘The Kaliningrad Oblast Code of Administrative Offenses’” 
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All of these laws. I argue, are discriminatory and anti-democratic nature. The 
legislative measures establish social disparity in traditional and non-traditional 
relations by prohibiting public displays of affection between same-sex partners, 
which contradicts the principle of non-discrimination of international human 
rights law (explain further, cite references). Homosexuality is defined as 
corrupting the youth. The aforementioned Ryazan law directly states that it creates 
“measures aimed at ensuring intellectual, moral and mental safety of children in 
the Ryazan region” (Law of Ryazan oblast, dated June 15, 2006 N 66-03). The 
state hierarchizes sexuality by defining homosexuality as an influence that 
corrupts minors. Such a discourse produces a notion of the correct sexual behavior 
that transcends into the political realm, reinforcing the heteronationalistic nature 
of the nation-building. Discuss more. 
The laws contain outdated, explicitly offensive language. Instead of using 
internationally appropriate term “homosexuality,” the laws utilize the Russian 
term “homosexualism,” which pertains to a set of ideas or ideology. The term is 
often used by policy-makers to dismiss same-sex relations as a deliberate strategy 
to undermine their inclusion in Russian society. The Kaliningrad law is to some 
extent unique. Not only does it use the word “sodomy” and put homosexuality 
together with pedophilia, it also forbids “propaganda” related to “non-traditional 
relations” among all the citizens of the region, not just minors. The St. Petersburg 
law also uses the word “sodomy” to denote same-sex practices among men.  
The language utilized by the legislators aims at restructuring sexuality on a 
political scale, subjugating homosexuality to heterosexuality. It allows for 
deployment of political homophobia in order to create a sense of national unity 
based on sexuality. Conservative heteronationalism reflected in the legislation 
portrays the Russian nation as purely heterosexual. Russians who do not fit the 
category are deprived of recognition and representation.  
 
Political Roots of the Institutionalization of Homophobia in Russia 
 
Political homophobia as a strategy of the Russian state cannot be understood 
without reference to the destructive experience of the demasculinization of the 
country that eventually led to the welcoming of authoritarianism. In this case, 
Vladimir Putin used sexual minorities in order to construct an image of an external 
threat and its internal “agents.” However, not only homosexuals were portrayed 
that way. Russian NGOs that receive funding from foreign sources were also 
marginalized and labeled as “foreign agents.” 
Historically, the Soviet regime used the political ideology of communism to 
lessen anxiety about the future of the society by creating and sustaining a stable 
hierarchy of gender roles where masculinity was a central organizing norm. In 
many ways, the current conservative turn and the emergence of the authoritarian 
regime of Vladimir Putin find their political inspiration in the earlier periods of the 
Soviet history (Cannady & Kubicek, 2014; Lukin, 2009; Prozorov, 2005). The use 
of an external threat helped the government to demand loyalty within the country 
and provided a sense of unity to the nation. A perpetuated feeling of paternalism 
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placed the state in a position of decision-maker in every aspect of human life. 
Adrian Ashwin (2000) speaking about governing gender norms, notes that 
 
in the case of women, their role was defined as worker-mothers who had 
a duty to work, to produce future generations of workers, as well as to 
oversee the running of the household. Men, meanwhile, had an at once more 
limited and higher-status role to play. They were to serve as leaders, 
managers, soldiers, workers–in effect, they were to manage and build the 
communist system–while the state assumed responsibility for the 
fulfilment of the traditional masculine roles of father and provider, 
becoming, in effect, a universal patriarch to which both men and women 
were subject. In this way, masculinity became socialized and embodied in 
the Soviet state, the masculinity of individual men being officially defined 
by their position in the service of that state. (p. 1) 
 
The fall of communism and disintegration of the country resulted in a deep 
feeling of de-masculinization and loss of identity. The previously existing gender 
roles carefully crafted and transmitted through generations were shaken by the 
significant economic and political turmoil. Additionally, the abrupt and substantial 
impoverishment of the population and the decline in male life expectancy 
negatively affected the ability of men to provide not only for their families but to 
the nation as well (Riabov & Riabova, 2014). The loss in the Cold War with the 
West left a deep wound in the consciousness of the population. It also led to a 
sense of demasculinization which, as Riabov and Riabova (2014) argue, had two 
effects, 
 
first, there was a significant weakening of the country’s international 
position because of the nation’s defeat in the cold war, the collapse of the 
USSR, and the Russian army’s defeat in the war in Chechnya in 1994–
1996. Second, human trafficking reminded Russian men that they were 
unable to take care of their nation’s women. Moreover, Russia in the 1990s 
was quite often portrayed not as a mother but rather as a woman of easy 
virtue; prostitution became a metaphor for the country’s foreign policy. (p. 
25) 
 
The weakening economy of the country compelled Russian leaders to turn to 
Western countries in order to seek financial support. This reinforced the image of 
an impoverished country begging from its neighbors with an outstretched hand 
and painfully harmed the national pride of Russians. The lost status was further 
reinforced by Western countries expansion of NATO and the bombing of 
Yugoslavia despite protests from Russia. No longer acting from a position of 
strength (a traditionally masculine notion), Russian society harbored some 
resentment against Western democracies. 
Flush with victory in the Cold War, in the early 1990s Western European 
countries failed to fully engage Russia in the democratic process and the work of 
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European institutions. Weak ties between the European institutions made it 
unfeasible to influence the Russian government on issues such as gay rights15 
(Ferrari, 2016). However, some European institutions such as the Council of 
Europe in the early 1990s demanded decriminalization of homosexuality before it 
could welcome Russia (Bohan, 2014). The Yeltsin administration in 1993 
excluded “muzhelozhestvo” (male-to-male sexual practices) from the Code of 
Criminal Offence.16 The emergence of LGBT activism in post-Soviet Russia could 
have been a first step towards the inception of a statewide LGBT movement. Yet, 
as Laurie Essig (1999) notes, it was not the birth of the movement, but rather a 
miscarriage (p. 67). After the abrupt emergence of the LGBT movement in the 90s 
by the beginning of the 2000s, it was almost invisible (Essig, 1999; Nemtsev, 2008). 
Decriminalization did not lead to de-stigmatization of Russian gays and 
lesbians. Baer (2009) writes, “Western-style homosexuality, or what Altman has 
referred to as the “global gay,” has become a convenient symbol of Western 
cultural imperialism, involving the encroachment of Western values (overt 
sexuality, non-reproductive sex, and consumerism) and Western political concepts 
(tolerance, diversity, and civil rights)” (p. 6). For the government, juridical 
decriminalization of homosexuality was a tool in negotiations with international 
organizations and foreign governments. Therefore, homosexuality was used 
politically in two ways. In domestic affairs, the government was silent about rights 
of homosexuals in order not to attract unnecessary criticism of the public. In 
foreign affairs, homosexuality was used to show ongoing democratization of the 
country. 
The growing visibility of sexualities on TV and on the streets of Russian big 
cities quickly ignited a feeling of domestic homophobia within the population. 
Homosexuality, in particular, was seen as “a foreign import, that is, a direct effect 
of Western influence” (Healey, Baer, & Stella, 2008, p. 6). As Massad (2002) 
observes, “by inciting discourse on homosexual and gay and lesbian rights and 
identities, the very ontology of gayness is instituted in a discourse that could have 
only two reactions to the claims of universal gayness: support them or oppose them 
without ever questioning their epistemological underpinnings” (p. 374). The 
majority of Russians show strong animosity toward same-sex practices and 
visibility of homosexuals. 
It is important to emphasize that the decriminalization of homosexuality in 
Russia was not a response to a growing LGBT activism. On the contrary, Russian 
gay and lesbian groups, that started emerging as early as 1993, were weak and 
disorganized nationally. As Bosia and Weiss (2012) suggest there is a clear pattern 
of the diffusion of global homophobia because “in no context in the world are 
LGBT citizens the threat they are made out to be; the ubiquitous specter of married, 
child‐rearing gay men or lesbians inflates a tiny, often meek and nearly–or fully 
invisible minority, to nation-destroying stature, much as anti-semitism has done, 
                                                           
15 Russia decriminalized homosexuality in 1993 while excluded it from the list of mental 
illnesses in 1999.  
16 Here and after all translations from Russian into English are mine. 
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and frequently at the same time” (p. 20). This is certainly true for the Russian 
Federation of the 2000s when domestic homophobia became a strategic political 
tool. When this happened, the homophobic discourse and policies received 
overwhelming support from the general public for whom gays and lesbian were a 
symbol of Western liberalism (Koshelev, 2012; Levada-Center, 2015). 
Therefore, the 1990s became a lost period for LGBT activism in Russia. In 
the circumstances of a weak and dependent state, LGBTQ activists failed to push 
the government to deliver rights to Russian gays and lesbians. The society, feeling 
deprived of their masculine nature, associated homosexuality with 
demasculatinity. As a result, a politics of compliance with the West in exchange 
for scarce resources turned the Russian population against Western values. The 
government later used such attitudes to support a carefully crafted state strategy 
of political homophobia. 
 
Putin’s Conservative Turn  
and Institutionalization of Homosexuality in Russia 
 
At the beginning of his presidency in the 2000s, Vladimir Putin attempted to 
combine politics of “friendly relations” with the West and “patriotism” for his 
domestic constituencies. Although Putin’s Russia was allowed into many 
European and international political institutions, the country’s voice was barely 
heard by the Western counterparts. The last straw was a round of NATO expansion 
in 2007 with the inclusion of South and East European nations bordering Russia. 
This move was perceived as unfriendly and even aggressive by the Russian 
political elites. The offensive character of NATO and the reluctance to treat Russia 
as equal pushed the Putin administration into isolation and the search for a new 
ideology for domestic consumption. To unite the nation, the Kremlin turned to the 
ideology of conservative heteronationalism.  
Conservative heteronationalism in its Russian version represents an attempt to 
create of sense of national identity based on the construct of traditional values and 
heteronormativity. In such a social construct “nontraditional (that is, non-
heterosexual and non-heteronormative) sexual relationships are understood to be 
socially inferior” (Wilkinson, 2014, p. 372). 
With the growing conservative heteronationalism, homosexuals again 
appeared to be the focal point of the policies of exclusion. In order to posit Russia 
against the West, the government needed to identify a Russian group of people 
that would represent non-Russian values influenced by the West and serving as 
agents of Western corrupt influences within the country. Such tactics of carefully 
crafted state homophobia facilitates the state’s objective of uniting the society 
around its national leader. Writes Stähle (2015), “feared, condemned and 
demonized, homosexuality has been used for contesting power relations, 
articulating Russia’s sovereignty and defining the Self and the Other” (p. 52). 
Politically, it allowed the government to shift public attention to the minor 
problem, whereas the real social and economic issues remained without substantial 
public criticism. The parastatal media effectively accomplished the task. LGBTQ-
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rights organizations, in particular, became an exclusive aim of governmental 
criticism as agents of the western countries, especially the Unites States. It found 
support among the population. 
Russian researcher, Igor Kon, connects the initial conservative turn in 2005-
2006 that started when Ryazan Regional Assemble (Ryazanskaya Oblastnaya 
Duma) adopted a supplement to the local Law on Administrative Offenses to the 
current round of homophobia, claiming that it is organically linked to other forms 
of Soviet-Russian xenophobia (Kon, 2010; Nagel, 1998).17 The law used the 
Soviet derogatory term “homosexualism” combined with the outdated term 
“sodomy” that has religious connotations and the relatively new “lesbianism” 
which was not used previously.18 The law was contested in the Constitutional Court 
in 2009. In its decision the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation on 
January 19, 2010, declared, that 
 
… as such the prohibition of the propaganda–as a purposeful targeted and 
uncontrolled activity of the dissemination of information that may damage 
the health, moral and spiritual development, including misconceptions 
about the social equivalence of traditional and non-traditional marriage–
among persons deprived due to their inability to critically evaluate such 
information cannot be considered as violating the constitutional rights of 
citizens (Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, 2014). 
 
In 2012, the decision was appealed to the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC). 
The Committee decided that “the applicant’s conviction under the Ryazan Law on 
Administrative Offenses (Ryazan Region Law) which prohibits public actions 
aimed at propaganda of homosexuality among minors violated her right to freedom 
of expression, read in conjunction with her right to freedom from discrimination, 
under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)” 
(International Justice Resource Center, 2012). However, that decision did not 
                                                           
17 Zakon Ryazanskoi oblasti ot 15.06.2006 N 66-03 “O Vnesenii izmenenii v Zakon 
Ryazanskoi Oblasti “Ob Administrativnih Pravonarusheniiah” [Law of the Region of 
Ryazan dated 15.06.2006) N 66-03 “On the Changes in the Law of the Region of Ryazan 
“On the Administrative Violations”] Retrieved May 27, 2013 from the Region of Ryazan 
website: http://ryazan.news-city.info/docs/sistemsj/dok_oeqrlo.htm 
18 It should be noted that The Russian language often uses words “homosexualism” and 
“lesbianism” while in relation to heterosexual practices the word “heterosexuality” is 
used. The suffix “-ism” in many languages (Russian is not an exception) is used to create 
ideological concepts (socialism, capitalism, feminism, etc.). I would argue that artificially 
made mistranslation of homosexuality aims at showing political nature of the homosexual 
practices as if homosexuality was an ideology. 
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change the situation since the UN HRC does not have an effective leverage to 
pursue Ryazan Administration to change the law. 
Several other Russian regions followed the example – Arkhangelsk in 2011, 
Kostroma in 2012, St. Petersburg in 2012, Novosibirsk in 2012, Magadan in 2012, 
Samara in 2012, and Krasnodar in 2012–and adopted similar regional gay 
propaganda laws. Some of them are particularly important for analysis. St. 
Petersburg, considered the most European among Russian cities, adopted anti-gay 
law “On Amendments to the Law of St. Petersburg On administrative offenses in 
St. Petersburg” on March 30, 2012. Being homophobic in its very nature, the law 
also uses the outdated repressive language, interpreting the “LGBT” acronym as 
“sodomy, lesbianism, bisexuality, transgenderism” (Sperling, 2014, p. 299). 
The federal law “For the Purpose of Protecting Children from Information 
Advocating for a Denial of Traditional Family Values,” that unanimously passed 
the State Duma (one deputy abstained) put an end to regional legislative initiatives 
on June 30, 2013. The law became known as the “gay propaganda law” or the 
“anti-gay law.” It mainly faced criticism from abroad, while inside the country 
only a small number of democratically oriented organizations and human rights 
groups opposed the legislation and tried to appeal it but did not succeed. 
The vagueness of the language of the legislation opened up the possibility for 
authorities to eliminate almost all actions related to LGBT community–not only 
pride parades and other public marches, but also festivals, seminars, conferences, 
publishing, even the organizations themselves could be closed. Potentially, these 
legislative changes aim to erase all non-normative sexualities from the public 
sphere to sustain the Russian nation as purely heterosexual. As Healey (2003) 
argues, “Russians created a national sexual mythology that celebrated their own 
natural purity and located Russia between the dangers of a neurasthenic Europe, 
and a depraved and ‘backward’ East” (p. 4). 
The state explicitly politicized homosexuality, thereby making it a political 
force that is capable of influencing politics and hence change it. Homophobia lifted 
to the level of state policy created a scapegoated group of Russian homosexuals 
who became “representatives” of the Western culture, alien and dangerous to 
Russian state and society. Now they were the agents of the foreign government, 
traitors, and spies. The accusation of homosexuality deprives oppositional 
politicians of a chance to be elected. Governmental and Orthodox groups are often 
used to attack NGOs that work to shed light on government misconduct. Suspicion 
of promoting LGBTQ rights is utilized as an excuse for such actions. The Putin 
Administration uses homosexuality and those groups to blame the West for 
attempts to change the current political regime in Russia. It allows the leadership 
to intensify censorship and to suppress protest activity. 
 
Human Rights Regime 
 
Another major factor facilitating the creation of state homophobia policy is 
Russia’s indifference toward international norms and its own commitments. 
Russia is not part of the European Union, an organization that imposes some 
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legislative regulations on its members including regulations aimed at the 
prevention of homophobia. Even within the EU, there are cases like Poland, which 
attempt quite successfully to defy the EU recommendations and launch state 
homophobia after nationalists came to power in the mid-2000s. The United 
Nations institutions of human rights are weak and powerless in their ability to 
impose any kind of policies protecting people from deliberate policies of state 
homophobia. As Picq and Thiel (2015) insist, there has been no global treaty that 
would explicitly recognize rights of gays and lesbians within the worldwide 
context. This is not least due to countries such as Russia, where homophobia 
received state policy support. The only institute that can influence Russian 
legislation is the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), decisions of which 
Russia has to respect by the virtue of being a part of the Council of Europe and 
signing the treaty sanctioning superiority of the Court’s decision in respect to 
domestic laws. However, I argue that the dearth of legal and political mechanisms 
that are at the disposal of the international community leaves Russian homosexuals 
vulnerable to the machinery of the state. The state effectively uses Western 
critique of Russian LGBTQ policies to strengthen its own power by exposing 
interests of foreign governments as interfering with Russian domestic affairs and 
attempts to change the political regime inside the country. Homophobia is an 
excuse used to weaken an already faint Western influence in Russia that creates 
more severe conditions for homosexuals while strengthening the power and 
influence of the leadership, and diverting public attention from domestic problems. 
The Russian Constitution of 1993 declares that “in the Russian Federation 
recognition and guarantees shall be provided for the rights and freedoms of people 
and citizens according to the universally recognized principles and norms of 
international law and according to the present Constitution” (The Constitution of 
the Russian Federation, 1993). The recognition of and the emphasis on “universally 
recognized principles and norms” de jure puts Russia within a broader context of 
human rights regime embraced by the countries of Europe. In Article 15, it states 
that “the universally-recognized norms of international law and international 
treaties and agreements of the Russian Federation shall be a component part of its 
legal system. If an international treaty or agreement of the Russian Federation 
fixes other rules than those envisaged by law, the rules of the international 
agreement shall be applied” (The Constitution of the Russian Federation, 1993). 
This means that where the domestic laws are silent, international norms should be 
used to clarify blind spots. The provision would allow what Kollman (2013) calls 
socialization of international norms in Russia. Socialization is a “staged process 
of norm creation, promotion and internalization” that facilitates dissemination of 
same-sex unions and marriage laws within the European continent (Kollman, 
2013, p. 73). She notes an important role of national and international human rights 
activist groups in the socialization of norms and adoption of national legislation 
protecting rights of homosexuals. However, unlike in Europe, Russia’s weak 
LGBTQ community lacked the organizational and financial support necessary to 
successfully campaign for the promotion of gay rights legislation or set aside 
same-sex union laws until the mid-2000s when it faced a backlash from the 
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government in the form of state homophobia. As discussed, the state perceives 
attempts to define any human rights regime as an encroachment on its sovereignty. 
Timid attempts by gay rights activists to hold public events were not just banned 
by the government, but were also used as evidence of how corrupt and dangerous 
Western influences are at undermining the country’s moral and family values. The 
traditional value discourse that was subsequently produced sought to justify a 
departure from the policy of Europeanization. 
On February 28, 1996, the Russian Federation joined the Council of Europe. 
Its entry meant that the country became part of the continental legal space with 
commitments arising from the generally recognized norms of European law. 
Today Russia is involved in more than 30 European conventions, among them the 
European Convention on Human Rights of November 4, 1950. Despite the fact as 
Kollman (2013) notes that the Convention never explicitly stated gay rights as 
human rights, it nevertheless imposes some restrictions and obligations on 
countries that signed it. For Russia, its provisions with some reservations started 
applying in 1998. One of the major provision installs jurisdiction of ECHR.  
Since its creation, Russia along with Turkey and Poland have all had lawsuits 
filed against them. After the mayor of Moscow banned gay parades in the city in 
2006, 2007, and 2008, Russian gay rights activists filed a lawsuit against Russia. 
In 2010, the ECHR upheld the claim of one of the leaders of the Russian gay 
movement, Nikolai Alekseev. The Court found a violation of articles of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights: Article 11 (“Freedom 
of assembly and association”), Article 13 (“The right to an effective remedy”), and 
Article 14 (“Prohibition of discrimination”). In its decision the ECHR ordered the 
Russian side to pay Alekseev 12,000 euros and reimburse the costs in the amount 
of 17,500 euros. 
These and other human rights cases that Russia lost compelled the authorities 
to publicly denounce the court’s decision as political and deliberately anti-Russian. 
In 2007, the chairman of the Constitutional Court Valery Zorkin stated that “the 
European Court of Human Rights, replacing the Supreme Court, the Arbitration 
Court and the Constitutional Court of Russia, performs the role of national 
authority, which is contrary to its nature and purpose” (Savina & Ivanitskaya, 2007, 
p.1). In 2010 Chairman Zorkin and then President Dmitry Medvedev said that 
Russia did not give the ECHR power over Russian sovereignty to make decisions 
about Russian legislation. Zorkin (2010) emphasized that, 
 
having no direct precedent, the decision on the granting a parental leave to 
a male soldier for child care, the Strasbourg Court, in this case, used the 
legal position from the case of “Smith and Grady v. The United Kingdom,” 
which granted the dismissal from the armed forces of homosexuals. Of 
course, in the Russian Federation, as in any modern country, sexual 
minorities are protected by the principle of legal equality, that all are equal 
before the law and the courts; State guarantees equality of rights and 
freedoms, regardless of sex (Art. 19 of the Constitution). However, the 
“enthusiasm” of the modern European legal systems in protecting rights 
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and freedoms of homosexuals acquired grotesque forms. Sometimes this 
can lead to a tragedy, as it happened recently in Serbia, where rejection of 
the gay pride parade in the traditionally Orthodox country resulted in riots. 
(p.1) 
 
The position of the Chairman of the Russian Constitutional Court presents Europe 
as aiming to change Russian values and impose a gay agenda. Regardless of the fact 
that most of the cases in the European Court against Russia did not concern rights of 
gays and lesbians, the justification used to criticize the Court was often connected 
to homosexuality. Even slight, timid attempts to promote gay rights within the 
country caused a massive backlash used to justify not only tougher measures 
towards Russian homosexuals but a massive criticism of European institutions and 
their human rights doctrines. 
In 2014, the ECHR again attracted criticism when President Putin highlighted 
that gays and lesbians may threaten national security. He responded that just like 
the United States, Russia has the right to comply or not comply when “it is 
advantageous and necessary to ensure our interests” (Putin, 2014). He also noted 
that the Court’s decisions are most often political. In 2015, a group of State Duma 
deputies appealed to the Constitutional Court to assess the possibility of 
recognition and enforcement of judgments of the ECHR that contradict the 
provisions of the Constitution and the legal positions of the Russian legislation. 
The court decided that “Russia may exceptionally depart from the execution of 
entrusted obligations if such derogation is the only possible way to avoid the 
violation of fundamental constitutional principles” (Mikhailova & Makutina, 
2015). On December 15, 2015, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a bill 
allowing the Constitutional Court to wholly or partially ignore the ECHR’s 
decisions.  
Despite the fact that the Russian Federation is a member of many European 
political institutions including the Council of Europe, the EU as a whole as well 
as its individual members have very limited mechanisms of influence over 
Russia’s attitude towards Russia’s gay community. Unlike in the case of Poland 
that at the beginning of the 2000s had to go through the EU inspection and change 
its laws in order to become a member, Russia did not experience such pressure. 
However, similarities exist in the cases of Russia and Poland. Both countries have 
experienced the impact of totalitarian communist ideology. Communism in its 
Soviet version was an ideology “where ‘the other’–any other–is reflexively 
identified as hostile and created by immutable forces of history, something to be 
feared and ultimately crushed” (Hayden, 2016). The sense of suspicion of “the 
other” and the fear of the overthrow of the regime from abroad deeply penetrated 
the ruling class psychology in Russia which was socialized during the Soviet 
period (Hmelevsky, 2014; Shevtzova L.F., 1996). 
There are also some peculiar similarities in the positions of churches in both 
states. In the Russian Orthodox Church as well as the Roman Catholic Church in 
Poland, both Churches stressed national identity in opposing gay rights. In Russia, 
as Stähle (2015) argues, “the Russian Orthodox Church made a significant 
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contribution to the articulation of traditional family values and moral standards, 
arguing that Russian society was endangered by individualism, consumerism, 
secularism, and homosexuality” (p. 52). The position of the Russian Orthodox 
Church was outlined by Patriarch Kirill (2013) who depicted attitudes toward 
homosexuality in Western Europe as “dangerous apocalyptic symptom” and 
highlighted the necessity to “ensure that sin is never sanctioned in Russia by state 
law because that would mean that the nation has embarked on a path of self-
destruction” (p.1) . 
Poland used the rhetoric of “propaganda of homosexuality” approximately 
five years before the same homophobic discourse was deployed by the Russian 
politicians. In the case of Poland however, there was a response and efforts of joint 
actions of European institutions and community to pursue the government to soften 
their homophobic rhetoric and policies. But those efforts proved weak even within 
the EU boundaries. The nationalist-led government did not stop using homophobia 
to oppose the EU until it fell in 2007 (Weiss & Bosia, 2013). The weakness of the 
European legal and political systems does not allow them to influence Russian 
politics. This is especially true of verbal attempts to point out any Russian 
government misconduct with respect to homosexuals. Even an eminent 
intergovernmental organization such as the UN lacks the capacity to drive its 
members to adopt national legislation prohibiting homophobia and promoting 
rights of gays and lesbians. There is no “legal binding global treaty” that would 
explicitly recognize rights of LGBTQ community worldwide and by the virtue of 
the UN, authority prohibits homophobic policies of certain states (Picq & Thiel, 
2015, p. 54) 
Lack of the enforcement power of the UN is due to its origin as a post-world 
war institution, perpetuating the realist political vision of countries as winners and 
losers. The only body that has the power of decision-making–the Security 
Council–does not concern itself with human rights or LGBTQ rights. Even if it 
had to deal with such issues, the Council is divided between two often opposing 
forces of the Western democracies on the one side and Russia and China on the 
other. 
The General Assembly consisting of all member-states is an even more 
polarized institution. It became clearly visible in 2008 when only 66 of the 192 
countries “mainly from Europe and Latin America endorsed a non-binding 
declaration of human rights, sexual orientation, and gender identity” (Picq & 
Thiel, 2015, pp. 54-55). The Declaration faced opposition from Russia and some 
other countries. The United Nations Human Rights Council, the body whose main 
goal is to oversee and protect human rights around the globe, also adopted a 
resolution on June 30, 2016, on “Protection against violence and discrimination 
based on sexual orientation, and gender identity” (Human Rights Watch, 2016, p. 
1) Russia, which lost its seat in the Council in 2016, voted against the resolution 
(Roth, 2016). The symbolic victory of LGBTQ community perpetuated by the 
adoption of the resolutions, has, unfortunately, little power to change homophobic 
legislation that exists in Russia. 
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Thus it is evident that the international human rights regime, created by 
multiple institutions, has little impact on Russia. In the absence of significant 
leverage over Russian politics, attempts by European and international 
organizations to combat the state homophobia are either neglected by the state or 
used to justify tougher measure to protect national sovereignty and identity. Voices 
of human rights advocacy groups, international institutions, and politicians are not 
heard in Russia. On the contrary, the state by the means of controlled media 
produces a homophobic discourse that portray gay rights as part of a larger attempt 




State homophobia in Russia is being used to create a sense of national unity in the 
face of “the other” portrayed as the collective West with its values, discourses, and 
policies. The regional “anti-gay propaganda” laws that were finalized by the 
enactment of the federal law banning so-called propaganda of non-traditional 
sexual relations among minors follows from the idea that the Russian nation is a 
heterosexual nation, and homosexuality is non-Russian. However, homosexuality 
is not simply non-Russia, it is Western. This anti-Western homophobic discourse 
produced by politicians has existed within public consciousness since the Soviet 
times. Accompanied by societal homophobia, the government scapegoats LGBTQ 
rights activists within the country. Any attempts by international groups and 
governmental bodies from abroad to point out government misconduct is criticized 
as the desire to influence the internal politics of the country, undermine the 
foundations of its constitutional regime, and violate the democratic will of the 
Russian people. This strategy is used primarily as an excuse for non-fulfillment of 
decisions from the International Court of Human Rights in confrontation with UN 
decisions to protect the rights of LGBTQ people. Domestic audience perceives it 
as a sign of strength rather than weakness. 
The government also uses such state homophobia to divert public attention 
from domestic problems. Blaming the West for the struggling economy is 
currently one of the main strategies the government employs (Polunin, 2017; 
Rapoza, 2014). In this situation, Russian homosexuals are presented as Western 
agents that are paid to destroy family values and national identity. The current 
Russian policy is to build the nation based on conservative heteronationalism 
characterized by stable gender norms, traditional family values, the aggressive 
rejection of non-normative sexuality, and opposition to the West. That approach 
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